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1 Introduction
Since the discovery that chimpanzees are able to pass a simple mirror test (Gallup
1970), much has been written about how self-awareness manifests itself in human and
animal behaviour. When one removes an unusual mark on one’s face that a mirror
reveals, does the removal count as evidence for self-recognition? If it does, does it also
count as evidence for the existence of a rudimentary self-concept and/or the capacity to
ascribe properties to oneself? While Gallup has argued that a properly executed mirror
test warrants a positive answer to these questions (Gallup 1982, 1998; Gallup et al.
2014), others have interpreted the mirror task as indicating only a sensorimotor capacity
to match visual and kinaesthetic stimuli (see Mitchell 1993a; Heyes 1994; Povinelli and
Cant 1995; Povinelli 2000; Schwenkler 2008). Further evidence from developmental
studies suggests that success in the mirror task may be indicative of a socially induced
form of self-awareness that emerges from integration of both perceptual and interper-
sonal experiences (see Rochat 2001; Rochat and Zahavi 2011). None of these inter-
pretations has found general acceptance, however.
In this paper, I argue that in order to advance the debate on mirror self-recognition,
two critical moves need to be made. First, we need to overcome the common sense
intuition that recognizing oneself in the mirror is an all-or-nothing phenomenon. It is a
well-established empirical fact that “self-recognition does not emerge suddenly with
one particular behaviour, but develops gradually” (Bertenthal and Fischer 1978, p. 44).
This observation holds not just for self-recognition in general, but also applies specif-
ically to the phenomenon of mirror self-recognition. Like other cognitive achieve-
ments, recognizing oneself in a mirror requires some practice and therefore allows for
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“partial accomplishments” (see Courage et al. 2004). Second, we must allow that the
process of learning to recognize oneself in a mirror may vary from species to species.
While experiments with non-human animals may demonstrate the proficiency to track
how sensory stimuli vary with bodily movements, similar experiments with children
may reveal something else about what goes on in the mind of a 2-year-old child when it
responds meaningfully to its mirror image. Accordingly, the apparently contradictory
views mentioned above may turn out to be compatible to some extent.
Once mirror self-recognition is conceived of as a gradual phenomenon, there is
conceptual space for a notion of partial self-recognition that precedes the ability to fully
understand the nature of one’s mirror image. But what does it mean to partially
recognize oneself in a mirror? How can we make sense of this prima facie puzzling
idea? Perner’s seminal work (Perner 1991) suggests that an important skill children
acquire during their second year is the ability to use multiple models in representing
facts that do not fit into their reality model. Numerous studies confirm that this ability is
a necessary prerequisite for children’s pretend play, synchronic imitation, and early
empathic responses (see Asendorpf and Baudonnière 1993; Bischof-Köhler 1988,
2012). Given the fact that children manifest these abilities at the same age when they
first pass a mirror test, their behaviour in front of mirrors may express their capacity to
operate with multiple models.
The goal of this paper is to explain children’s early success in the mirror task with a
multiple-models theory of partial mirror self-recognition. One of the principal advan-
tages of this explanation is that it allows us to integrate otherwise incompatible views
about the mirror task. Accordingly, the first part of the paper reviews the controversy
about Gallup’s interpretation of the mirror task and explores what lessons one can learn
from that debate. Section 1 sets the stage by offering a piecemeal definition of mirror
self-recognition. Section 2 takes a critical look at a rich, mentalistic interpretation of the
mirror test, while Section 3 explores the limits of a more parsimonious interpretation
based on the sensory-kinaesthetic matching hypothesis. Section 4 engages with the
scepticism about the mirror task that prevails in the philosophical literature and rebuts
what I call “The Master Argument against the mirror test.” Part two of the paper,
starting with Section 5, introduces the multiple-models hypothesis for explaining why
mirror self-recognition is developmentally related to pretend play. Section 6 elaborates
the hypothesis and answers objections against taking a capacity for pretence to play a
role in the mirror task. Finally, Section 7 shows how the concept of partial self-
recognition also sheds light on the affective qualities of mirror experiences when
children are stunned or embarrassed to see their faces.
2 Setting the stage
What happens cognitively when we recognize ourselves in a mirror directly facing us?
A funny story told by the physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach reveals the complexity
inherent in this well-known phenomenon (see Mach 1886). Once Mach stepped on a
bus and thought he saw a shabby schoolmaster doing the same, only to recognize a few
moments later that he was looking at himself in a mirror. If we conceive of this event in
slow motion, we can see it unfold in four steps: (1) seeing someone that looks like a
shabby schoolmaster, (2) taking this person to step on the bus at the very same moment,
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(3) recognizing the awkwardness of the coincidence and suspecting that there may be
no other person there, and finally (4) recognizing that one sees one’s own mirror image.
Analysing the phenomenon further, we may define the concept of mirror self-
recognition in a piecemeal way, as follows:
A subject S recognizes herself in the mirror if and only if S comes to know in some
way or other
(i) that the perceptual experience is not to be taken at face value,
(ii) that the source of the visual impression of another person is oneself,
(iii) that the appearance of another person provides information about oneself,
(iv) that one is looking at an image of oneself.
The definition leaves open how the subject comes to know what the four clauses
specify. Some of this knowledge may be purely procedural knowledge, while some of it
may be declarative knowledge and require the formation of explicit beliefs about
oneself. Regardless, as long as a subject does not explicitly form the belief that she is
seeing herself in the mirror, we do not have a case of mirror self-recognition in the full
sense. Conceiving of mirror self-recognition in this way resolves what Rochat refers to
as the “self-other paradox”, which requires “the suspension of the normal social
experience of others facing you with eye contact. Mirror reflection of the self is
paradoxical in the sense that what is seen in the mirror is the self as another person”
(Rochat 2001, p. 205).
To notice and resolve the self-other paradox, one must step back and reflect on the
awkward nature of the described experience. This raises the question as to whether there
may be a pre-reflective form of self-recognition that avoids the paradoxical situation of
identifying oneself with what looks to be different person. With the help of our
piecemeal definition, we can see how this might be possible. Each clause in the above
definition describes a new insight that adds something to what the subject has already
discovered. Thus, it may be that an animal or a child realizes that there is something
awkward about the reflective images in mirrors without realizing that it can control these
images. Gaining such control may therefore count as a pre-reflective or naive form of
self-recognition. Such naivety is no longer feasible once a child begins to wonder about
her control over the mirror image. Indeed, she may doubt her own competence and feel
anxious about observing a scene while also being part of it. It may then take several steps
to overcome this confusion until a child fully grasps how she can stand in front of the
mirror and at the same time be the person in front of her that is looking at herself.
It thus becomes clear that the phenomenon of mirror self-recognition can be tested at
different levels. Gallup’s famous mirror mark test targets this complex phenomenon at a
more basic level than Mach’s story. What this test reveals may be only the naive form
of self-recognition that subjects possess when they satisfy conditions (i) and (ii). Or it
may reveal something about the confusion that arises when children become wary of
their own mirror image, or the trajectory that enables children to reach the level of full
self-recognition. Since these possibilities are often not spelled out, one easily gets the
impression that “the research literature [on the mirror test] is full of contradictions”
(Bertenthal and Fischer 1978, p. 44). But these apparently contradictory views may
simply turn out to be accounts of different aspects of what is a highly complex
phenomenon.
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In taking this liberal stance, I try to avoid prejudging things by what would be a
merely terminological decision to use the term “self-recognition” in either this way or
that. We can thereby avoid asking the wrong questions; there is no point in asking
questions that eventually turn out to be unanswerable. Thus, instead of asking:
Q1: Can one demonstrate self-recognition with the mirror test?
a better question is:
Q1*:Which components of full self-recognition can be tested with the mirror test?
One also cannot expect an answer to the following question:
Q2: Does mirror-self recognition imply the presence of a self-concept?
We should rephrase the question in this way:
Q2*: Which components of full mirror self-recognition involve the use of a self-
concept?
Admittedly, simpler formulations are often more attractive. It may seem tedious to
translate sloppy uses of the term “self-recognition” into a more precise idiom, as it is
tedious to replace straightforward questions like Q1 or Q2 by more cumbersome
questions like Q1* and Q2*. A more precise idiom, however, enables us to determine
what we can learn from seemingly incompatible interpretations of the mirror task.
3 The mentalistic interpretation
In his extensive writings on the mirror test, Gallup advocates an interpretation of the
test according to which it reliably indicates whether an agent recognizes itself in the full
sense (Gallup 1970, 1977, 1982, 1994, 1998).1 For Gallup, passing the test means to
detect an unusual change in one’s appearance. This requires a self-concept and aware-
ness of the fact that one’s appearance changes over time. Since such awareness involves
an active use of memory about oneself, it also means that one has at least some insight
into one’s own mental capacities and one’s existence in time. This leads Gallup to
regard the mirror test as a proof that self-awareness, consciousness, and mind are not
“mutually exclusive cognitive categories” (see Gallup 1982, p. 237).
Such far-reaching conclusions require strong empirical support. Gallup therefore
makes much of the fact that a mirror test, as he conceives it, must follow a rigorous
procedure. By changing the procedure, Gallup fears that one makes it too easy for
animals to pass the test. For example, from the fact that elephants, dolphins, or even
pigeons successfully perform some test with mirrors, it does not follow that they
1 But Gallup comes close to acknowledging that the mirror test may target only a weaker sense of self-
recognition; he says that chimpanzees (but not monkeys) “realized that their behaviour was the source of the
behaviour being depicted in the reflection” (Gallup 1994, p. 35).
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possess a self-concept.2 Only chimpanzees and orangutans have passed a rigorously
performed mirror test, Gallup holds. What, then, is the procedure on which Gallup
bases this claim?
Gallup’s study with chimpanzees consisted of observational and testing phases.
In the first phase, he observed that some chimpanzees showed a peculiar interest
in mirrors and used it to inspect body parts that otherwise they could not see.
Taking this to be a sign of self-recognition, Gallup hypothesized that the chim-
panzees would notice some clearly visible change in their appearance, like a rouge
mark on their face. After allowing the chimps to remain acquainted with mirrors
for 10 days, he anaesthetised them and marked their faces with an odourless dye
above one eyebrow and on one ear. When the animals fully recovered, Gallup
reintroduced mirrors into their cages. He then recorded all movements that seemed
to indicate the animal noticing marks on its face. Relevant movements included
touching the marked areas, examining them closely in the mirror, and trying to
remove the markings. Gallup also controlled for mark-directed movements when
the animals could not see their mirror image. If there was a significant increase in
mark-directed behaviour in front of the mirror, the animal passed the test.
Gallup’s experimental approach supersedes all prior findings about animals’
and humans’ behaviour in front of mirrors. Yet it is far from clear that the testing
procedure with all its control conditions warrants the conclusion that there is “a
qualitative psychological difference among primates,” namely a capacity for self-
recognition that “may not extend below man and the great apes” (Gallup 1970, p.
87). There are many questions that need to be addressed before one can accept that
conclusion. Why, for example, is it important that animals are first familiarized
with mirrors before taking the test? What happens cognitively during this initial
phase of the experiment? Do they form memory images of what they look like,
which later enables them to discover unusual marks as diverging from their
normal appearance? Or do they need this training period merely to get used to
the presence of mirrors and suppress aggression stimulated by them? Another
concern is their level of motivation. It could well be that animals recognize
changes in their appearance yet feel no compulsion to respond to them; they
might simply lack any such motivation. Furthermore, there may be alternative
explanations for animals’ failure to respond to mirror marks in the way Gallup
expects. Finally, one might raise a question about the different motor skills
employed by elephants, dolphins, birds, and so on. Can one dismiss these differ-
ences when conducting mirror tests, or does success depend on specific forms of
bodily self-awareness that may differ markedly in different species?
The lesson here seems to be that not all of Gallup’s specific measures may be
essential for properly executing a mirror test, while independent evidence is needed to
support the psychological conclusions he draws from the data. This becomes even more
vivid when one performs a mirror test with young children. While the procedure is
basically the same, researchers usually skip the initiating phase because most children
2 Animal studies employing some version of a mirror test have produced many surprising results that are not
easy to explain. It is not clear, for example, why not all Great Apes seem to be able to pass such tests. Gorillas
often do not respond to their mirror image even after long exposures, whereas corvids can be rather easily
trained to do so. (See Parker et al. 1994; Keenan et al. 2003, and Gallup et al. 2011.)
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are already accustomed to mirrors in their environment even if they have not yet
learned to see themselves in mirrors. Few reports exist regarding how children or
adults respond when confronted with a mirror for the very first time. (I will discuss one
such case in Section 7.) Additionally, researchers do not anesthetize children, but mark
their faces while they are awake in a way designed to disguise the manoeuvre. Children
may nonetheless notice the markings at a subconscious level, and this may influence
the results collected during the testing phase. Furthermore, there are notable exceptions
to the claim that children normally pass the test between the age of 18 and 20 months
(to which I will return below).
Nevertheless, there are psychologists who agree with Gallup’s heuristic, even if they
do not accept his specific conclusions about the minds of animals. They agree, in other
words, that “it may be heuristically valuable to suppose that organisms capable of
recognizing themselves in mirrors are creatures that can conceive of themselves”
(Gallup 1998, p. 240). We see this heuristics at work in Lewis and Brooks-Gunn’s
comment about a 15-month-old boy: “Self-recognition implies to us that David has a
notion of self, a notion that he has existence in a particular point in space and that this
existence has characteristics or features” (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn 1979, p. 6).3
Thus we are left with a dilemma. If one follows Gallup’s presumption that self-
recognition involves possession of a self-concept, then it becomes questionable
whether the mirror test really shows that self-recognition in this sense takes place.
To avoid such scepticism, one may revert to a less demanding notion of self-
recognition that does not require all the controls that Gallup specifies. But then
one must admit that this more basic form of self-recognition may be found much
more widely in the animal kingdom and much earlier in human development than
has been assumed.
Various attempts have been made in the literature to distinguish between
conceptual and non-conceptual, reflective and pre-reflective, or explicit and im-
plicit forms of self-awareness (see e.g. Bermùdez 1998). While such distinctions
may be useful in a broader investigation of self-awareness, I do not think that a
distinction between explicit and implicit forms of self-recognition could resolve
the dilemma at hand.4 First, these distinctions may not be equivalent and they all
rest on highly controversial presuppositions. Second, as we have already seen,
there is a more direct way how we can distinguish between different levels of
mirror self-recognition; we do not need such general distinctions for introducing a
concept of partial mirror self-recognition. And thirdly, how one understands the
notion of explicit self-recognition largely depends on whether one takes it as
implying possession of a self-concept. The case of chimpanzees might be a reason
to rethink such an implication. That is to say, we might stick with the view that
nonhuman primates do not possess a self-concept, but grant chimpanzees more
than an implicit self-awareness if it turns out that they realize more about the
nature of the mirror image than a purely behavioural interpretation of the mirror
test allows. In order to assess this possibility, however, we must first consider what
a purely behavioural interpretation amounts to.
3 For a more recent defence of this claim, see Savanah 2012. For a critical reply, see Mitchell 2015.
4 For similar concerns about employing such distinctions, see Musholt 2015.
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4 The behavioural interpretation
In this section, I examine an alternative interpretation of the mirror test that tries to
explain success with more basic cognitive abilities than those involved in
possessing a self-concept (see Heyes 1994, 1995, 1996; Mitchell 1993a, b,
1997, 2003; Povinelli and Cant 1995, and Povinelli 1995, 2000; Schwenkler
2008). The conclusions these authors draw from the mirror task can be interpreted
in different ways. On a weaker reading, their view provides a critique of Gallup’s
mentalistic interpretation, but leaves the reliability of the mirror test unchallenged.
On a stronger reading, the critique amounts to a denial that the mirror test is a test
for self-awareness or for self-recognition at all.
According to Mitchell, success in the mirror test is enabled by a kinaesthetic-
visual matching mechanism that is either missing or disturbed in animals that fail
the test (Mitchell 1993a, b, 1997). Povinelli & Prince take a similar line when they
explain an interesting dissociation between young children’s competence in
responding to their mirror image and incompetence in recognizing themselves
on videos:
“[O]ur explanation begins by denying that self-recognition has anything to
do with understanding the reflective property of mirrors… [T]he typical
development of a domain-general system of representation in 18–24 month
old children provides them a means of forming relations between objects and
events in the world and schemes held in mind. […] [T]he ability to form
such equivalence relations allows the organism to understand that the repre-
sentation of self held in mind (an immediate, on-line representation of the
self’s actions, movements, and possibly desires) is equivalent to the image
they see in the mirror. […] This does not require the organism to understand
that the mirror is an accurate and contingent image of itself.” (Povinelli and
Prince 1998, p. 52 f.)
In further studies, Povinelli demonstrated how limited an apparent capacity for
self-recognition can be by introducing a temporal delay (Povinelli 2001). 5 He
filmed 18–24 month-old children while their faces were secretly marked. After a
few minutes, he showed them videos of the marking event and then observed how
they responded to these videos. Although most of these children passed a
standard mirror test, hardly any of the children could use the information on
the videos to detect the mark on their own face. If children are unable to process
the information presented in video recordings, this raises some serious questions
about their live performance. Do these children possess a capacity for self-
recognition that they can exercise only in certain conditions, or do they merely
manifest a behavioural skill that enables them to behave as if they were recog-
nizing themselves in a mirror? Since the latter possibility cannot be ruled out,
success in a mirror test does not warrant an inference to self-recognition, since
5 More recent studies by Suddendorf confirm Povinelli’s data and provide further evidence about children’s
difficulties with recognizing themselves in videos. (See Suddendorf 1999.)
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they still lack the domain general system of representation required for recogniz-
ing oneself in a mirror.6
Heyes takes this scepticism further when she attacks the methodological legitimacy
of Gallup’s procedure. She declares any evidence provided by the mark test to be “no
more compelling than anecdotal reports of mirror self-recognition,” and contends that
research in this area has “led to a considerable waste of time and resources,” since the
test is not a “valid measure of mirror self-recognition” (Heyes 1995, p. 1541, Heyes
1996, p. 470). In contrast to those who think that videos may provide us with a clearer
view of when self-recognition sets in (see Eddy et al. 1996), Heyes doubts that
videotaping instead of directly observing test subjects would bring us any closer to a
reliable test for self-recognition (see Heyes 1995, p. 1538). In this connection, she
mentions the following task in which not only chimpanzees, but rhesus monkeys are
quite proficient: using a joystick to track moving objects on a screen with a cursor. To
pass this test, the animals do not need to know anything about the technology that links
their movements of the joystick with the movements of the cursor. All they know is
how “to use the cursor position as a source of novel, displaced, visual feedback on the
position of its hand” (Heyes 1994, p. 917). Heyes contends that in a similar way,
animals might learn to use the information they receive from a mirror image. Contrary
to what Gallup concludes about the inability of monkeys to pass the mirror test, then,
Heyes predicts that sooner or later, “evidence of mirror-guided body inspection will be
found in both chimpanzees and monkeys” (ibid.)
Thus, Heyes recommends that one should stop using the term “self-recognition” in
connection with the mirror test, and instead refer to it as a form of mirror-guided
behaviour. Notice, however, that this conclusion is warranted only if one takes “mirror
self-recognition” to mean self-recognition in the full sense. Heyes tacitly makes this
assumption when she presumes that self-recognition requires a second-order represen-
tation of oneself:
“[I]f it were shown, using a properly designed experiment, that an animal can use
a mirror to derive information about its body, we would not automatically have
evidence that the animal ‘recognizes’ itself, or even its body, in the mirror. […] to
use a mirror in this way it would not be necessary for the animal to recognize, or
form a second-order representation of, the representational relationship between
the mirror and its body. In principle, the animal could simply use the information
available in the mirror image, without having any thoughts about why the
information is available or useful.” (Heyes 1996, p. 472.)
What Heyes describes here is another form of the dilemma mentioned earlier: Either
we take the term “self-recognition” to mean self-recognition in the full sense, in which
case we can attribute such a cognitive achievement to an animal only if it possesses the
capacity for second-order representations. Or we interpret the capacity to pass the
mirror test as a kind of practical skill, in which case there is no good reason why we
6 Povinelli and Cant 1995 speculate that a domain-specific skill of matching stimuli might explain the
extraordinary climbing technique of orangutans called “clambering”. In the same vein, one might speculate
that a domain specific skill in using cameras might enhance children’s comprehension of their own video
recordings.
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should describe this skill as a form of self-recognition at all. But why accept this
dilemma in the first place? Why not allow for the possibility that some animals
recognize themselves in a mirror in a “naive” way without making use of second-
order representations?7
It is not within my expertise to evaluate the empirical plausibility of Heyes’
predictions. But it requires no such expertise to see that her radical scepticism about
the mirror test goes too far. We should not forget that the same task may pose different
demands for animals and for human children. If you ask a layman and an expert to
describe an archeologic site, for example, the former may find the task quite easy
because he does not recognize subtleties about which the archeologic expert is acutely
aware. Something similar could be true for the mirror task. Young children who pass a
mirror test may have to cope with the illusory experience of seeing another person in
the mirror. This could make the task considerably more difficult for them than for
animals that, by having become accustomed to mirrors, no longer experience this
illusion. This consideration shifts the burden of proof onto the sceptic; for the sceptic
must explain why monkeys fail a mirror test that should be no more difficult for them
than the cursor-tracking task that Heyes describes. Even if these tasks may be similar,
engaging with one’s mirror image may involve an extra difficulty that specific species
might simply overlook or ignore, while others cope with it directly.
5 A master argument against the mirror test
Let me now turn to the philosophical debate about mirror self-recognition, in which a
certain form of scepticism has become the prevailing attitude. Drawing on the empirical
considerations just reviewed, the sceptical position is that the mirror test tells us very
little about the nature of human self-awareness.8 The sceptic’s reasoning takes different
forms depending on what background assumptions are in play. However, there seems to
be convergence on a general argument that I would like to make explicit. I call it the
Master Argument against the mirror self-recognition test:
1. Self-recognition requires an explicit form of self-awareness.
2. Visual-kinaesthetic matching does not imply an explicit form of self-awareness.
3. Passing the mirror test requires only visual-kinaesthetic matching.
Therefore: Passing the mirror test is not a reliable indicator of self-recognition.
As one can see, the notion of “explicit self-awareness” figures prominently in this
argument. That is also it’s weakness, I will argue, because the force of the argument
rests on an equivocation as to what explicit self-awareness means. Taken in one sense,
the conclusion of the argument becomes incontestable, while taken in another sense, the
argument can easily be blocked by rejecting its third premise. One can deny this
premise because, as mentioned before, passing the mirror test can mean different things
7 The suggestion to take an embodied approach to mirror self-recognition points in the same direction. (See
Schwenkler 2008.)
8 In contrast to this attitude among philosophers, Gallup takes the critique lightly and sees no reason to change
his view, (see Gallup and Povinelli 1993; Gallup 1994; Gallup et al. 2011, 2014).
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for subjects with different capacities. Subjects with an explicit self-awareness may not
be able to pass the test without noticing that they are in full control of the mirror image
they produce, while subjects that lack such an explicit self-awareness may pass the test
merely by using a sensory matching mechanism.
Let me illustrate this general observation with discussions of mirror self-recognition
by Lynn Rudder Baker, David Papineau, and Tyler Burge. All of them take a sceptical
stance towards the mirror test. If my criticism of the Master Argument is sound, this
consensus needs to be reconsidered.
Baker discusses mirror self-recognition as a potential problem for her distinction between
what she calls “weak” and “strong” first-person phenomena (Baker 2000, p. 60). In the first
category she puts the subjectivity of experience, distinguishing it from the ability to represent
oneself as oneself—a strong first-person phenomenon. The problem for Baker arises from
the observation that “chimpanzees’ self-recognition seems to fall between weak and strong
first-person phenomena” (ibid. p. 62). To maintain a sharp line between subjective phenom-
ena and genuine cases of self-consciousness, she contends that it is a necessary condition for
any form of self-consciousness that one be able to represent oneself as oneself (ibid. p. 67
and p. 69). This leads her to take the following position on the mirror task: although
chimpanzees can recognize themselves in a mirror, this does not provide any evidence for
self-consciousness or possession of a self-concept. In response to this, it may be said that
Baker’s entire argument depends on a very strong interpretation of ‘explicit self-awareness’.
Why should one accept on such an interpretation the first premise of her argument?
In a similar vein, Peacocke takes issue with Gallup’s test as demonstrating posses-
sion of a full-blown self-concept. The same points that weaken Baker’s criticism
therefore might also apply to Peacocke’s reasoning. Yet, in contrast to Baker, Peacocke
acknowledges a form of self-awareness that does not require a self-concept. With that
possibility in mind, Peacocke offers a more nuanced account of the mirror task:
“It is not at all obvious that the kind of self-consciousness manifested by passing
the mirror test is restricted to creatures who possess concepts. […] Intuitively, the
kind of self-consciousness required to pass the mirror test involves taking a third-
person perspective on oneself, while appreciating that it is oneself who is present
in that third person perspective. That is something that could in principle be done
at the nonconceptual level.” (Peacocke 2014, p.192)9
In order to get clear about what Peacocke proposes here, we would need to know
how the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual self-consciousness maps
onto the four components in my piecemeal definition of self-recognition. Presumably, a
form of self-recognition that does not involve all four components would count as a
form of non-conceptual self-consciousness. But then the Master Argument would not
go through, because such non-conceptual self-awareness requires more than a capacity
for matching visual and kinaesthetic stimuli. That is to say, by saving premise (1) of the
argument, Peacocke pays the price of making premise (3) false.
9 While such a non-conceptual self-awareness may be involved, it is not necessarily required, as Peacocke
points out when he says that it may “very reasonably be objected that the ability to use a mirror in removing a
mark from one’s forehead can be explained without attributing to the animal recognition of itself in the mirror”
(Peacocke 2014, p. 191).
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Finally, consider what Tyler Burge has to say about the visual-kinaesthetic matching
mechanism that enables animals to pass a mirror test:
“…connections among kinaesthetic proprioception, the proprioceptive body sche-
ma, and visual perception [allow] the perceiving individual to associate ego-centric
indexes with the same individual as perceived from the perspective of different
perceptual modalities. The perceived individual is perceived as having ego-signif-
icance, in this limited way, from different perspectives.” (Burge 2013, p. 151 f.)
Tellingly, Burge mentions in this context neither that the mirror test is supposed to be
a test for self-recognition nor that self-recognition is supposed to imply a form of
explicit self-awareness. The omission of these background assumptions may suggest
different things. It might suggest that for Burge the mirror test does not test for self-
recognition at all, as the Master Argument says. However, Burge might also want to
suggest that self-recognition requires a level of self-awareness that transcends the kind
of information processing that underlies perceptual experience. I am inclined to follow
this latter interpretation. The perceptual skills that Burge mentions are clearly not
sufficient for an explicit kind of self-awareness. Hence, at least in the human case,
where we know that such forms of explicit self-awareness exist, we cannot assume that
children pass a mirror test without recognizing themselves in some way. That means,
once again, that at least in the human case premise (3) of the Master Argument fails.
As these examples from the philosophical literature illustrate, the Master Argument
only appears to be a strong argument against the mirror test. In fact, the conclusion of
the argument is either obvious, or the argument can be resisted by questioning its third
premise, depending on what we presuppose – or know from independent evidence –
about the self-awareness of an agent taking a mirror test. Now that this argument is out
of the way, I will try to advance the debate by proposing an interpretation of the mirror
test that avoids the shortcomings of both mentalistic and behaviouristic interpretations.
6 The multiple-models theory of partial mirror self-recognition
While Gallup tested chimpanzees for self-recognition, it was found that children pass the
same test beginning at the age of 15–18 months (Amsterdam 1972). In studies with
children it is usually taken for granted that “passing the test” means to progress from
seeing another person to recognizing oneself in the mirror. Many developmental re-
searchers assume that children are capable of making this large step by the age of
18 months: “Full self-recognition of a mirror image as their own occurs unambiguously
in most infants at about 18 months of age when they respond to a spot of rouge that has
been covertly applied to their nose” (Courage et al. 2004, p. 510). Nevertheless, there are
notable exceptions to the claim that children normally pass the test between the age of 18
and 20 months. In cultures where children are highly submissive to adults, they hesitate
much longer or do not try to remove the mark from their face (see Broesch et al. 2010).
Relatedly, children tend to behave differently when they notice that other people have been
marked in the same way (see Rochat et al. 2012). These results remind us that it seems to
be an incredibly large step from (erroneous) other-recognition to a full blown self-
recognition. Are 2-year-old children really capable of taking this step?
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In answering this question, it will be crucial to take a closer look at other cognitive
capacities that develop at nearly the same time. More specifically, it is significant that
children who pass mirror tests also show the first signs of empathic responses (Bischof-
Köhler 1988, 1991), pretence and invisible displacement (Perner 1991; Gergely 1994),
synchronic imitation (Asendorpf and Baudonnière 1993; Asendorpf 2002), and per-
sonal pronoun use (Lewis and Ramsay 2004).10 These correlations are hardly acciden-
tal—and they motivate taking a more general approach in how we explain children’s
success in the mirror task.
According to Perner’s influential theory, a common factor that explains why these
achievements evolve together is the use of multiple models (Perner 1991). When children
incorporate all of the information that they receive from their environment into a single
model, their conception of reality remains limited to what they can presently perceive and
what is consistent with their present perceptions. It is only when children learn to construct
alternative models that their reasoning takes them beyond what is presently given. Multiple
models enable them to compare their present situation with memories of past events so that
they can construct models of hypothetical situations. They also enable children to learn to
play different roles by imagining themselves in another person’s situation. These are the
primary achievements attained during the second year of life which indicate that a major
development in children’s cognitive abilities has occurred.
Early cases of mirror self-recognition in infants may turn out to be yet another
manifestation of the ability of using multiple models. In what follows, I will take this
idea one step further and argue that in order to make sense of the partial character of
self-recognition in 2-year old children, we may presume that children also invoke their
newly acquired capacity for engaging in acts of pretence when they are puzzled by
seeing their own mirror image. That said, I will first briefly consider how the multiple-
models theory works in the case of pretence, invisible displacement, and empathy.
If an adult pretends to be a dog, a 1-year-old child observing his behaviour might not
know what to make of it. According to her model of reality, this behaviour is unusual
and incomprehensible. In order to make sense of the pretence, the child must construct
an alternative model in which barking noises do not only sound like the barking of a
dog, but also count as such. Now the child can approach the person playing a dog and
engage with him (or rather with the person playing the dog), using what she knows
about real dogs. She can act in an as-if mode, without devoting any thought to why the
other person acts as she does or what she is trying to achieve by it. Once the child
switches to an alternative model, the person playing a dog becomes a dog in the play-
world, and the child has to switch back to her reality model to make sure that the person
playing the dog is still a human person.
Consider next invisible displacement. What needs to be explained here is why 2-
year-old children, but not 1-year-olds, search for an object that is placed under a cover
while children observe the hiding. Children restricted to the use of a single model fail
this test, Perner suggests, because they continuously update their model of reality and
10 How the formation of a self-concept ties in with the use of the first person pronoun is a highly problematic
question that must be left open here. On this issue, even foremost experts do not seem to have a settled view.
For instance, Rochat contends that “it is feasible that self-concept emerges under the pressure of growing
linguistic competence,” but then corrects himself by saying that “although language and explicit self-concept
appear connected in the timing of their emergence, it does not mean that they are mutually dependent.”
(Rochat 2001, pp. 192–193).
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ignore information that is inconsistent with it. What they see from this restrict-
ed perspective is that an object is first present and then no longer present. From
this information alone they cannot infer the invisible location of the object.
They begin to comprehend what is going on only when they use two models to
represent the sequence of events. While continuously updating their model of
reality, children also construct an alternative model with information retrieved
from memory—a model that is inconsistent with their current model of reality.
In this way, they can represent the object that is presently invisible as still
existing in the alternative model. The contrast between these two situations
(object visible / object not visible), may prompt them to start looking for the
object close to where they last saw it.
In a similar vein, Perner’s theory also explains why children do not show signs of
empathy before they learn to use multiple models. Children are born with a tendency to
suffer from emotional contagion. It is for this reason that they get upset and start crying
when they hear other babies cry or notice their distress. As long as they cannot resist such
contagious emotions, children are not in a position to empathize with others by offering
help or comfort. They are themselves in need of being consoled. Perner contends that
children need multiple models to overcome this problem. If a child perceives that another
child’s teddy bear is torn open, she can filter out this information by locating it in a mental
file that concerns only the other child and not herself. Distancing herself from the stressful
experience in this way relieves the child from getting upset; and this enables her to
develop empathic responses (see Perner 1991, pp. 132 ff.).
All this shows that multiple models are a powerful tool that may explain a wide
variety of achievements, including pretend play, searching for invisible objects, and
empathy. How then could it also explain children’s success in the mirror task? In taking
this step, it is crucial to draw a distinction between self-recognition in the full sense and
what is merely a partial form of self-recognition. The idea is not completely new, but is
usually not spelled out in sufficient detail to see how it works. Courage presents the
idea only briefly in this short remark:
“In the case of mirror self-recognition, for example, the child may be coming to
terms with two “selves” that are normally viewed as one – the already present and
familiar self perceived through the temporal contingency of visual-proprioceptive
information and the one they see reflected in the mirror who ‘looks and moves
like me’. (Courage et al. 2004, p. 529)
The crucial question that Courage only touches here concerns the “partial accom-
plishment,”, as Haith and Benson (1998) call it, that lies in between not recognizing
oneself at all and being fully aware of the fact that one sees a reflection of oneself in the
mirror. I suggest that we may describe this phenomenon as follows:
(i) The child is still in the grip of seeing another child.
(ii) It does not believe, but pretends that there is another child in front of her.
(iii) It realizes that by using her normal skills it can control the duplicate body in the
mirror.
(iv) It is motivated to act such that the other child looks normal, or is good-looking,
charming, etc.
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Each of these conditions is crucial for explaining the special significance of the mirror
test. Condition (i) explains why the situation in front of the mirror may be more difficult
to comprehend for a child than for a chimpanzee that is no longer seeing a conspecific in
the mirror. As in the case of perceptual illusions, children may not be able to completely
suppress the impression that some other person is there, perhaps staring back at them.
Not being able to fully comprehend the situation either, they might come up with the
“trick” of using multiple models for cognitively resolving the illusory experience. The
trick consists in pretending, instead of believing, that one sees another person in the
mirror. This is what condition (ii) suggests. Condition (iii) describes a skill that animals
may also possess when they figure out how to gain control over the image that they no
longer perceive as the image of a conspecific. Finally, condition (iv) is crucial for
explainingwhy children are motivated to respond to the discovery of the secretly applied
mark if they do not identify themselves with the person wearing the mark. When they
first touch the mark (on their own face, not in the mirror), this may be explained as a way
of testing whether they are still in control of their duplicate body. Hence they know that
they did not mark themselves. Removing the mark may then be explained by a desire for
their duplicate body to look normal. Children also sometimes pose in front of the mirror,
behaviour that may also be explained by a desire for their duplicate body to look strong
and attractive. I will return to the affective dimension of a mirror experience in Section 8,
after some further clarifications of my proposal.
7 Further clarifications
So far I have argued that Perner’s multiple-models theory leads to a plausible expla-
nation of early mirror self-recognition; and I have connected this with the idea that
children at this age might pretend, but not believe, to see another person in the mirror.
Now it is time to address some worries that this proposal raises. In particular, I need to
say more about the conceptual requirements that an act of partial self-recognition
involves. Does it require possession of a minimal self-concept? If so, what might such
a concept amount to? Relatedly, I will address the worry that pretending to see another
person in the mirror is a much more complex task than what the multiple-models theory
suggests. It also may be objected that since there are some obvious differences between
acts of pretence and an act of mirror self-recognition, those differences speak against
my account of partial self-recognition. Finally, I will address the objection that the
account I am offering is artificial and that there may be more natural ways to implement
a theory of partial self-recognition.11
Does partial self-recognition require a minimal self-concept? This question arises
because it seems necessary, on the present proposal, for a child to have such a concept
in order to respond by touching herself after discovering a mark on her face via a
mirror. In order to explain this fact, the multiple-models theory seems to require that a
child has to represent herself as existing in different models. That is how Perner
11 I am happy to take up these objections here that reviewers have raised against an earlier version of this
paper. It also has been suggested that my proposal is ad hoc and lacking empirical support. This objection I
take to be unjustified given what I have said about the need for a notion of partial self-recognition and how it
fits in with the data that support a multiple-models theory.
J.L. Brandl
describes from a first person perspective the discovery that one would make in taking a
mirror test:
“In order to understand that the person in the mirror is myself, I have to be able to
construct two models, one in which I figure as myself in reality and another in
which I figure as myself in the situation reflected in the mirror.” (Perner 1991, pp.
132f.)
If children took this reflective stance, the following sequence of thoughts would
have to occur in a child’s mind:
1. In the situation reflected in the mirror, I have a mark on my face. (Model 1)
2. The situation reflected in the mirror is the same as the situation in reality.
3. I have a mark on my face in reality. (Model 2)
Those who think that 2-year-old children already possess a minimal self-concept
might find nothing objectionable in ascribing such thoughts to them. Such a response
would be in line with interpretations of the mirror task requiring a form of “self-
objectivation” (see e.g. Bischof-Köhler 1991). It would also accord with the view that
mirror-recognition shows that children conceive of themselves as objects in public
space (see Rochat and Zahavi 2011). However, none of these claims follows from the
multiple-models theory alone.
These claims do not follow because the multiple-models theory does not require
children to take the reflective stance that Perner describes. Perner is far from endorsing
Gallup’s rich, mentalistic interpretation. He agrees with Heyes and Povinelli that one
can pass a mirror test without understanding the mirror as a representational medium
(see ibid., p. 132, and p. 133fn.). Thus it is not clear that one needs a self-concept to
update one’s reality-model after seeing oneself in the mirror. Nor is it clear that one
needs to understand that the situation reflected in the mirror and the situation depicted
in one’s reality-model are identical. These are insights that may come only much later
when one achieves full self-recognition.
This leaves us with the question as to how we might articulate the content of the two
models that the child constructs without using the first-person idiom. How can we
explain the relation between the two models if the child does not represent herself as a
part of both models? If a child does not yet possess a self-concept, obviously it is
difficult to make explicit the thoughts that might cross her mind during a mirror task.
One might despair of this problem and revert to the idea of “immediate self-recogni-
tion” that requires no inferential process at all (see Schwenkler 2008). But I think we
can do better than that.12
The child may use one model for representing what people usually look like and
another model for representing the unusual person that the child sees in the mirror. As
in a pretend play, information put into the second model is not used to update the
child’s reality model. As such, the child does not see herself, but rather a funny looking
12 Schwenkler may be right, however, that pathological failures to recognize oneself in a mirror may best be
explained as a deficit arising on the sensorimotor level and not from a failure to draw inferences of a certain
kind.
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person in her mirror-world. If the child wants to bring the mirror-world in correspon-
dence with reality, i.e. with what people normally look like, it may act in accordance
with the following inference:
1*. This person has something unusual on her face.
2*. This person should be like other people.
3*. This person will look normal if my face is cleaned.
Since the first-person idiom is still needed in the final step of the child’s reasoning,
one might still suspect that a self-concept must be operative if the child cleans her own
face. At this stage, however, the use of the pronoun “my” in step (3*) does not carry the
same significance as the pronoun “I” in an act of self-reflection. Specifically, it does not
signify that the child has formed a self-image that contrasts with her mirror image and
thereby indicates that there is something wrong with her appearance. Such self-
reflection presupposes that the child identifies itself with the person it sees in the
mirror; and we have yet no reason to assume that such an identification takes place.
I consider it to be a major advantage of the multiple-models theory that it can show
us how to avoid ascribing explicit first-person thoughts to those who pass a simple
mirror test. The kind of first-personal reasoning that is required for relating the two
models may be explained at a procedural level without ascribing even a minimal self-
concept to a 2-year-old child. Nevertheless, the cognitive skills of children passing the
mirror test cannot be reduced to the simple coordination of perceptual stimuli. While
such coordination may explain an animal’s success in the mirror task, it may turn out
that not only the possession of a self-concept, but also the use of multiple models is a
distinctively human achievement. Nothing is prejudged about a crucial difference
between animals and humans here, however. If it turns out that such an intermediary
approach is also useful in the study of mirror self-recognition in animals (see Swartz
1997), we might have to reconsider whether some animals have the skill to build a
model around their mirror image and use it for engaging in an act of pretence. This
would not threaten, but strengthen my proposal, because it would give the multiple-
models hypothesis a further domain of application.
How can one pretend to see another person in the mirror? If an adult person sees
herself in the mirror, she may not like what she looks like and therefore imagine seeing
someone else. Such cases of self-deception may take different forms, depending on
whether it is just a playful thought or whether the person really comes to believe that
what she sees is not herself. In either case, it may seem far-fetched to claim that
something similar happens when a 2-year-old child only partially recognizes herself in
a mirror.
Much depends at this point on how one conceives of the act of pretence that occurs in a
2-year-old child when it passes a mirror test. It is not the case, on my view, that such
pretence begins with the reflective first-personal question: “Is this really me?” In addition,
I do not want to ascribe to children a form of self-deception that involves self-alienation
when they pretend that there is someone else in the mirror. Pretending to see some other
person is not the same as pretending not to see oneself. The former act is much simpler and
leads to merely partial mirror self-recognition. That said, it need not be as simple as acting
like a dog. One may compare it with a form of “acting as if” that occurs when children
pretend that a block of wood is a car. In this case children do not behave as if the block
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were a real car; otherwise they would have to do a number of irrational things, like trying
to get inside the block. In the case of dogs, a cognitive capacity to switch betweenmultiple
models seems to suffice, whereas the latter case seems to require a minimal (if nascent)
understanding of the appearance/reality distinction.
At this point, it may seem that my account of partial mirror self-recognition will fail
for either of two reasons. The first is that children do not actually recognize themselves
in the mirror, as the multiple-models theory describes; they only behave as if this were
the case. This would align the present proposal with similar scepticism about self-
recognition in animals; but I do not think that the parallel holds. In the case of animals,
such scepticism is reasonable because all of the evidence that we have about animal
behaviour seems compatible with the hypothesis that they do not even partially
recognize themselves in mirrors. This is not so in the case of children, as we have
seen. Indeed, there is converging evidence that children at the age of two begin to
become aware of their own agency and relationship to others. Consequently, it would
require significant argumentation to make plausible the claim that children are capable
of no self-recognition at all. Nothing that I have claimed suggests that the multiple-
models theory could be used to support such scepticism. That a child does not fully
identify herself with the person in the mirror does not mean that she behaves only as if
she does.
The second objection is that children who can pretend that a block of wood is a
car might already be capable of self-recognition in the full sense. Leslie has argued
that such acts of pretence require a form of meta-representation and an innate
module for a “theory of mind” (see Leslie 1994). Yet this is far from clear, as I
have argued elsewhere (Brandl 2012). Children can learn to use multiple models
before they learn to reason flexibly about how different models can represent what
is real and what is not. Thus I see no reason why children should not be able to
pretend to see another person in the mirror well before they understand the
representational properties of mirrors, hence also before they are able to recognize
themselves in a mirror in the full sense.
Let me dwell on this critical point a little further. What evidence is there that
pretence in the mirror task may occur without a self-concept and without the capacity
for meta-representation? Although I cannot offer direct evidence for this claim, there is
compelling indirect evidence. If children could not engage in such pretence, we could
not explain how a sensory-kinaesthetic matching mechanism might enable children to
pass the mirror test. Consider, for instance, the following description of sensory-
kinaesthetic matching by Gergely:
“We can assume that the [child] placed in front of the mirror has a primary model
of reality that contains representations of external objects as well as a represen-
tation of the self. […] When confronted with a mirror, with experience the [child]
learns to map the visual information in the mirror onto its primary model of
reality. […] However, this perfect correspondence relation breaks down when the
visual features of the image of the nonvisible parts of the body are mapped onto
the representation of the corresponding object in space. […] The systematic
correspondence between the primary model of reality and the mirror image can
be salvaged only by attributing to the self-representation the mismatching visual
features of the corresponding object in the mirror.” (Gergely 1994, p. 56)
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Gergely freely speaks of a “representation of the self” and of “self-representation” to
make clear that a child has to realize that something unusual happened to itself. The
child is supposed to realize this indirectly by noticing a mismatch between its normal
self-representation and the visual features of the corresponding object in the mirror.
When she notices this mismatch, the child attributes to itself the unusual feature (the
mark) by adding it to its self-representation; and this is supposed to explain why it
reaches up to touch or remove the mark that it has discovered in the mirror.
But is it necessary for the child’s primary model to contain a representation of itself
(if not of its self)? Consider the parallel that Gergely draws between success in mirror
self-recognition and success in the task of invisible displacement, when children use a
secondary representation (such as a memory image of the object disappearing) to
update their primary representation of reality. In both cases, Gergely suggests, a child
is “using information from sources other than direct perception” (Gergely 1994, p. 55).
No further conceptual differences need to be invoked to distinguish invisible displace-
ment and mirror self-recognition from a simple visual-kinaesthetic matching mecha-
nism. This means that from a conceptual point of view, passing a mirror test with the
help of multiple models may not be more demanding than passing it by using a
sensory-kinaesthetic matching mechanism. These are, of course, different mechanisms;
but neither of them presupposes a self-concept or the capacity for meta-representation.
Differences between pretend play and mirror self-recognition.While there may be a
common faculty that children use in both pretend play and passing a mirror test, it may
still seem unlikely that children actually pretend to see another person in the mirror.
There seem to be clear disanalogies between mirror self-recognition and pretend play
that cast doubt on this claim. First, in mirror self-recognition children do not express the
same kind of fun that they express in pretend play. Second, nothing in pretend play
corresponds to the child’s motivation to remove the mark from her own face. Third,
why do children show no surprise when they are able to remove unusual marks from
their own face?
Although these differences are undeniable, I do not think that they speak against my
account. Using multiple models is a very basic capacity that opens up a wide range of
possibilities for getting beyond reality. Some of these possibilities may be pure fun for
the child; some may be frightening; and cases of pretence may involve a mixture of
both. Mirror experience seems to be a mixed case because it involves both voluntary
and involuntary components. The presence of the mirror image is something with
which the child has to cope in one way or another. She is not free to make it up, as she
is free to make up the fantasy that there is a dog barking or that a wooden block is a car.
Additionally, she also has a limited capacity for making the mirror image disappear, for
example by changing her position or turning around, because the image will reappear
as soon as the child faces the mirror. It may therefore take some courage to interact with
this image as long as one does not fully understand its nature. This may explain why
children lose the playfulness that they first exhibit when trying to engage with the
“stranger in the mirror”. To overcome anxieties associated with the uncanny stranger, it
is helpful for children to discover that they can change the appearance of the mirror
image by drawing grimaces or make it move in accordance with their own movements.
The fact that it takes significant effort to turn the presence of the mirror image into a
pretended object may explain why there are no signs of fun or surprise left, once the
child has gained control over it’s mirror image.
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Is an act of pretence really necessary for partial self-recognition? Finally, one
might raise the objection that while the idea of partial self-recognition seems valuable,
one does not need a story about pretence to implement this idea. Why not use the
multiple-models theory without adding this problematic feature? If mirror self-
recognition works like invisible displacement, pretence does not seem to play an
essential role. Some proposals in the literature on mirror self-recognition point in this
direction, but they all seem to be missing something, which suggests that an appeal to
pretence is not superfluous in this context.
Jens Asendorpf discovered an interesting correlation between children’s ability
to engage in synchronic imitation and their ability to pass the mirror test (see
Asendorpf and Baudonnière 1993; Asendorpf et. al. 1996; Asendorpf 2002). Like
Perner, he suggests that in both cases children form a primary representation of
reality and then use a secondary representation to keep track of their own activity.
This enables them to detect whether another person is imitating their own behav-
iour, and then imitate the other person in turn to maintain the synchrony.
Asendorpf describes such imitation as a form of communication in which children
“enjoy the reciprocity inherent in their joint play” (Asendorpf 2002, p. 63). He
goes on to offer the following explanation of mirror self-recognition:
“Mirror self-recognition requires coordinating a mirror-image (primary represen-
tation) with one’s representation of oneself (the “Me”; James 1890). This latter
representation is a secondary representation because it is not a perceptual reality.
Instead it is a constructed mental image of oneself that can be manipulated in
fantasy.” (ibid., p. 66)
Like others, Asendorpf assumes that children can pass the mirror test only when they
represent their own activities as part of an explicit self-representation. In contrast to
Gergely, however, Asendorpf does not take this self-representation to be a primary
representation, but considers it to be a “constructed self-image”, i.e. a secondary
representation that is not part of the child’s perceived reality.
What this shows, I think, is that merely distinguishing between different models
– or representations, as Gergely and Asendorpf would put it – does not suffice to
explain how these models can be used in so many different tasks. Crucially,
children also need to have some understanding of how these different models
are connected. At a minimum, they must keep track of what remains constant from
model to model, something that a simple mechanism of switching from one model
to the other does not guarantee. That there always are some constant features
follows from the fact that the construction of a model always depends on what
children know about reality, by either modifying their reality model or enriching it
with additional information. Sometimes this enrichment will accord with what
they know about reality; for instance, when they reach for an object that is
currently not visible. But sometimes constructing a model requires generating
conflict with what the reality model contains. This is so in the case of both mirror
self-recognition and pretence, if one pretends a situation that does not obtain. A
child sees a flat, shiny surface (model 1) which displays a figure that looks like a
person standing behind the surface. She then transforms this perception into an
image of what becomes her pretended duplicate body (model 2). The skill required
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to do this is quite sophisticated, because it requires combining the reality of the
mirror with the non-real character of the person it presents. I cannot see how a
child could solve this problem – before fully coming to understand the nature of
the mirror image – without engaging in an act of pretence.
Another effort to propose a “moderate explanation” of visual self-recognition
has been made by Thomas Suddendorf and David Butler. They also invoke a
multiple-models theory to steer a middle course between Gallup’s rich interpreta-
tion and the lean accounts offered by its rivals (Suddendorf and Butler 2013,
2014). They present the core idea of their proposal as follows:
“[T]he test reflects the capacity to generate and compare multiple models of the
same thing. By comparing an expectation about one’s physical appearance with
current perceptions of a reflection, inconsistencies, such as the mark, can be noted
and motivate exploration.” (Suddendorf and Butler 2013, p. 122)13
Here Suddendorf and Butler provide a plausible answer to the question as to
why children should be motivated to remove a mark from their forehead. To wit,
they must have an expectation of what they normally look like and share a
motivation to restore “normality”, when they discover the unusual mark in the
mirror. If children are indeed surprised, or even shocked by the mark, this may be
the right explanation. But as I mentioned before, shock or surprise are not
necessary features of early mirror self-recognition. For this reason, we also need
an explanation why children remove the mark from their forehead when we have
no reason to ascribe to them an expectation of what they normally look like. On
my account, what suffices to explain this behaviour is a general expectation what
other people normally look like and a preference for the child’s duplicate body to
look like a normal person. In this way, we need not assume that children have the
constant expectation of not wearing funny marks on their face. Instead, we explain
why they remove the mark from their own head by the fact that they lack any
motivation to pretend that somebody is wearing such a mark.
Pointing out these differences in explaining mirror self-recognition may seem
tedious; but solving the puzzle of self-recognition hangs precisely on these differ-
ences. There is no reason to attribute to children self-representational abilities that
would allow them to perceive themselves in a mirror like adults do. My contention
is that children at the age of two are not yet able to do so. They achieve something
quite different which is even more remarkable: they keep attending to the mirror
while seeing in it a child in whose existence they no longer believe. Without fully
comprehending the situation, they use a trick of pretence to get a grasp of and
thereby control over the initially strange figure. This achievement is so extraordi-
nary that it deserves its own description: partial self-recognition.
13 One must be careful here not to confuse the “collating of representation”, as Suddendorf & Butler call it,
with a visual-kinaesthetic matching mechanism that Mitchell postulates in his explanation of the mirror task.
The former concept requires children to use multiple models, and is therefore cognitively more demanding
than a simple matching mechanism that may be found in many species. Musholt seems to overlook this
difference (see Musholt 2015, p. 150).
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8 The affective dimension of the mirror experience
Since the invention of the mirror test, the question has been discussed whether
emotional responses may be indicators as to when children begin to evaluate and hence
recognize themselves in a mirror. The emotional responses that seem relevant range
from excitement or playfulness to coyness, frustration, aggression, and embarrassment,
but also include forms of pleasure and pride (see Amsterdam 1972; Lewis and Brooks-
Gunn 1979; Rochat 2003, 2009; Lewis 2011). In this final section, I want to show how
the present theory can shed light on some of the emotional responses that young
children exhibit when they become acquainted with their mirror image.
Rochat and Zahavi claim that this is the most serious problem for any theory of self-
recognition that focusses on representational skills (see Rochat and Zahavi 2011). How
can we explain why the mirror experiences has its “uncanny” nature and why children
avoid seeing themselves in the mirror or “freeze” in an embarrassed state in front of
their mirror image? I will not be able to address these questions in full detail. The
following remarks should suffice to show, however, that cognitive explanations like the
one offered in this paper can meet this challenge to some extent. First, I will attempt to
dispel the worry that the theory I have proposed underestimates young children’s
performance in mirror tasks by disregarding their emotions. This complaint would be
justified only if children’s emotions were helpful in recognizing themselves in a mirror.
But this does not seem to be the case. Second, I will show how the multiple-models
theory may actually provide a plausible explanation for the confusion that children
seem to feel when they are puzzled by their own mirror image.
There are three kinds of affective responses elicited by the mirror test: responses
typical for children that do not yet pass the mirror test; responses typical for children
that fully understand the nature of the mirror image; and responses typical for children
that are in a transitory phase between not recognizing themselves and fully recognizing
themselves.14 In the first category we find signs of excitement, wariness, and aggres-
sion. These responses may be explained by the fact that children responding in this way
have unrealistic expectations about what the mirror image indicates to them. They
might want to engage with a playmate, get excited about doing so, and then become
insecure or aggressive when their expectations are frustrated. The third category could
include all affective responses that children might share with adults when they observe
themselves in a mirror, including feelings of pride and shame. There is reason to
assume, however, that at the age of two such complex emotions can exist only in a
very rudimentary form. We may therefore expect the affective responses of children
passing the mirror test during their second year to be found mostly in the second
category. Two-year-olds might experience the tension of not knowing how to respond
or feel embarrassed about the effect that their own movements have on the person in the
mirror. They may also feel relief or joy after resolving this tension by utilizing multiple
models and a trick of pretence.
14 This is a very rough distinction that would certainly need to be refined in a fuller treatment of this topic. It is
worth mentioning, though, that this is tripartition does not coincide with another tripartition suggested by
Bischof-Köhler. She distinguishes between children not passing the test (non-recognizers), children passing
the test (recognizers) and children that she classifies as “transitional” (see Bischof-Köhler 1988). While for
Bischof-Köhler most two-year-old children are clear recognizers, they are still in the second category
according to my scheme, because they do not yet fully comprehend the nature of the mirror image.
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What I have not yet mentioned are basic kinds of “social emotions” that according to
Rochat and Zahavi play a central role in mirror self-recognition, even before children
are capable of experiencing pride and shame. Such social emotions generate the
existential feeling of being “exposed” to the view of others and of being alienated:
When I am seeing myself in the mirror, I am seeing myself as others see me. I am
also seeing myself as if I was another, i.e., I am adopting an alienating perspective
on myself. The enigmatic and uncanny character of the specular image is
precisely due to this intermingling of self and other.” (Rochat and Zahavi 2011,
p. 209)
Rochat and Zahavi rely here on the work of phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty,
whose view on this matter they summarize as follows:
“Merleau-Ponty’s central idea is that mirror self-recognition exemplifies a trou-
bled form of self-knowledge. To recognize oneself in the mirror does not simply
involve an identification of the felt me which is here, and the perceived me which
is there, it also and more importantly involves the dawning realization that the felt
me has an exterior dimension that can be witnessed by others […]. In short, the
decisive and unsettling impact of mirror self-recognition is not that I succeed in
identifying the mirror image as myself. Rather, what is at stake here is the
realization that I exist in an intersubjective space. I am exposed and visible to
others.” (ibid. p. 209)
To which of the three aforementioned categories does the experience that
Merleau-Ponty describes here belong? Rochat and Zahavi contend that feelings
of exposure and alienation are manifest as soon as children pass a mirror test, if not
before. But in making this claim, they may overestimate the emotional capacities
of children at this early age.
One example discussed by Rochat and Zahavi does not seem to support their
view. This is the exceptional case of a Russian boy that was deliberately kept away
by his parents from all mirror surfaces until he was 2 years old. When Svyto finally
was given the opportunity to see himself in the mirror, he embarked on an
emotional “roller coaster”, as Rochat and Zahavi describe it on the basis of the
film that documents the case:
“After a period of puzzlement and hesitation, Svyto first tries to engage his own
image in playful exchanges, getting very excited in fencing and banging the
mirror, exploring then the perfect contingency of his own movements and the
movements of the specular image experienced. He eventually shows great dis-
tress and despair in not being able to create a dialogic exchange with the image.
[…] In a last sequence, after approximately 40 min, the movie shows Svyto
coming to terms with his own reflection. […] relishing his own specular image,
admiring and combing his hair with obvious delight.” (ibid., p. 210, fn. 6.)
This description mentions no feeling of exposure or alienation. Generalizing from
this case, one can raise two crucial questions about the role of emotions in children’s
J.L. Brandl
mirror experience: (1) How far might unpleasant emotions hinder children from
recognizing themselves in a mirror? (2) How far might positive feelings help them
eventually see themselves in the mirror image? The view advocated in this paper
suggests the following account.
According to the multiple-models theory, a rather subtle change in children’s
emotional experiences is to be expected when they change their attitude towards the
person they see in the mirror. They no longer believe that they see another child in the
mirror, but go on to pretend that it is there. In this way, they lose the cognitive basis for
emotions related to this belief, while retaining the opportunity for an emotional
engagement with a person they do not take to be real.
Precisely how this pretence modulates their emotions is of course difficult to say.
Whatever those emotions might be like, however, they will hardly resemble the feelings
of a person that takes it to be a matter of fact that she is looking into her own eyes when
she stares into a mirror. This once again highlights the fact that children who pass the
mirror test at the age of two are still in a transitory phase. They have moved beyond the
stage when they are simply disturbed by the stranger in the mirror, but they are still a
step away from understanding why there is no one there. In this transitory state, the
emotions that children experience may be confused emotions. 15 They are certainly
confused in their verbal responses, as the following report by Povinelli about his 3-year
old daughter testifies. After seeing herself in the mirror, Jennifer expressed her puzzle-
ment thus: “It’s Jennifer, but why is she wearing my shirt?” (Povinelli 1995, p. 81).
The report about Svyto also makes sense from this perspective. It shows a boy
in the transitional phase between not recognizing and recognizing himself in the
mirror; and this is why his emotions are so varied and volatile. Even when Svyto
finally seems to learn that he is seeing himself in the mirror, it is not clear that he
actually admires himself. Playing a game in which he engages with a strange
duplicate would also explain his joy. In coming to terms with his mirror image, he
might enjoy seeing a happy boy in the mirror; and this may help him calm down
and become happy. Such positive emotions, in turn, may help the boy eventually
recognize himself as himself. In this way, an account of partial self-recognition
offers a plausible account of the emotional confusion characteristic of children’s
early mirror experiences.
Have we then finally solved the puzzle of mirror self-recognition? Given the
exploratory remarks in this final section, this claim would certainly be too strong.
When it comes to answering questions Q1* and Q2* from Section 1, however, it
seems that a solution is clearly in sight. The answer is just not as straightforward
as the simpler questions Q1 and Q2 would allow. Yet this is just as it should be.
We should not expect to reach a solution that dispels the magic of mirror
experience. Indeed, we still want to indulge in the mystery when we deliberately
pretend not to see ourselves in the mirror or be the shabby person we see. Without
acknowledging the peculiarity of such experiences, the puzzle of mirror self-
recognition will remain unsolved.
15 Lewis distinguishes between what he calls “exposure and evaluative embarrasment” (see Lewis 2011, p.
125). Whether these categories appropriately capture the kind of embarressment experienced by a young child
that is embarrassed about seeing herself in the mirror, must remain open at this point.
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